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!e article contends against a fallacious assumption that Croatian political emigra-
tion in the second half of the twentieth century formed a homogeneous and mono-
lithic whole, while it is rather the case that it was "ssured and destabilized by each 
successive wave of emigrants. !is di#erentiation is here presented in a number of 
contributions by Bogdan Raditsa, wri$en in the 1970s and published in Hrvatska 
revija predominantly and occasionally in other emigration journals as well. Raditsa, 
as one of the nestors of the “new emigration” occurring a%er World War Two, notes 
a trend of increasing radicalization of the emigrants entering political arena as a re-
sult of reprisals following the suppression of the Croatian Spring in 1971. !e 1970s 
are thus seen as a pivotal decade in which generational distinctions within Croatian 
emigration were manifested in a number of high-pro"le radical and terrorist acts 
commi$ed by the latest wave of emigrants. Raditsa’s position indicates his adherence 
to democracy and liberalism on the model of the United States, while he subjects 
di#erent models of political activism in emigration to reasoned scrutiny. His political 
analysis is not only a record of a diasporic intellectual disposition but also an incisive 
comment on the vicissitudes of Croatian politics in the sti&ing embrace of the Cold 
War. Consequently, an argument is forwarded that calls for a de"nitive inclusion of 
political diaspora into Croatian Cold-War history, while suggesting that such a goal 
might be achieved among other things by a sustained reception of Raditsa’s formida-
ble oeuvre.
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!is short essay—more than appropriately designated as a “working pa-
per”—comes from a larger project that proposes to trace a, tentatively titled, 
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transnational poetics of Croatian American diasporic writing in the twenti-
eth century. As a project pursuing Croatian American topics, it thus re&ects 
the most recent calls for transnational American Studies, even if its precise 
methods and scope have yet to be declared.1 Finally, as a fragment of yet an-
other larger undertaking, a still unrealized but sorely needed cultural history 
of Croatia in the Cold War, it is a historical investigation plain and simple, a 
work based on primary historical sources sca$ered among numerous Croa-
tian and U.S. archives, awaiting future researchers.
At the outset, it is worth highlighting at least two principal goals that 
this essay, as a part of a more ambitious e#ort, aims at ful"lling. !e "rst is 
to propose that diasporic intellectuals in the vein of Bogdan Raditsa (alter-
natively, Radica), and the work they carried out while in political exile, form 
a key, if missing, part of Croatia’s cultural history in the twentieth century, 
especially during the period of the Cold War when they were pointedly ex-
cluded from participating in the public life of socialist Yugoslavia. !e second 
goal is to point out what is one of the most charged periods of post-WW II 
Croatian emigration to the West, the turbulent 1970s. !e validity of this lat-
ter assertion will be tested in the remainder of the essay.2 
Boris Maruna, both a poet and long-term emigrant himself, reminisces 
in the a%erword to Vječni Split about Bogdan Raditsa and his staunch liber-
al orientation, placing him within the American political mainstream (188; 
similar observations are pro#ered by Ivo Banac in the preface to the same edi-
1   For more on this recent disciplinary orientation and a tentative articulation of 
its scope, goals, and methodology, cf. Fluck and Pease; Journal of Transnational American 
Studies (an e-journal hosted by the University of California).
2   When I say “missing,” I have in mind the almost non-existent reception in Croatia 
of Raditsa’s truly formidable, quantitatively speaking, oeuvre. It is deplorable that such 
an output—truly transnational in terms of its themes, as well as in terms of the author’s 
frequent changes of residence, broad cultural and linguistic literacy, and political acumen—
is still largely unrecorded in the Croatian public sphere and its intellectual hubs. One may 
hope that be$er times are in the o+ng since the announcement of the founding of the 
Raditsa research center in Split, his hometown. For an elaboration of this argument, cf. 
Đurešković.
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tion: cf. 8). Maruna observes Raditsa’s added qualities which turn him into 
one of the invaluable personages amongst the Croatian intellectuals sca$ered 
worldwide: “For Bogdan Raditsa has always been willing to talk, dispense 
advice, discuss things, which leads me to conclude that he is preeminently 
the man of the agora, the piazza, immersed in the Split mores” (188; if not 
indicated otherwise, all translations are by the author). Moreover, it is Maru-
na’s belief that Raditsa was one of the “truest men of the Mediterranean in 
Croatian political emigration. !is mostly means that he has carried within 
himself all the virtues and vices not only of his native Split but of the entire 
Mediterranean area, as well, which, as a historian, he intimately knew and, as 
its true son, loved above all” (189). 
Bogdan Raditsa (1904–1993), therefore, cuts a formidable presence 
in the political life of Croatian emigration in the second half of the twentieth 
century from whatever angle we look at it. Judging by his biography ever since 
he made it into top journalistic circles and subsequently into the diplomatic 
service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1930s and 1940s, his versatile ca-
reer was increasingly marked by an unmistakable and genuine political nerve. 
Initially, though, as a journalist and a foreign correspondent in a number of 
leading Yugoslav newspapers and journals, he was more interested in all man-
ner of cultural ma$ers, ranging from literature to history to philosophy. From 
the beginnings of his public engagement, Raditsa found himself in a unique 
position to experience "rsthand the rising and con&icting political ideolo-
gies engul"ng Europe in the run-up to the Second World War. His pre-war 
activities already carry unmistakable traces of his later liberal and democratic 
commitments, while his acquaintance with di#erent forms and features of the 
rising fascism and ideologies on the le% made him sensitive to their lures and 
misleading arguments.
!e next turning point for Raditsa came in the immediate wake of 
World War Two, when he found himself back in Croatia and Yugoslavia just 
as the new regime was taking hold. !e scenes later described in his memoires 
Hrvatska 1945 (Croatia 1945) bear forceful testimony of the initial, quite 
bloody and violent phase of consolidation of the new order. A%er witnessing 
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the ordeal of the new society for a short while, Raditsa le% the country in late 
1945 and would not return, it turned out, for the next forty-"ve years. A%er 
that he only visited Croatia in the early 1990s, shortly before his death in 
1993. During that time he lived in the USA, spent his summers in Italy (his 
wife, Nina Ferrero, was Italian), made his home a hub for Croatian émigrés 
and other anti-communist and anti-totalitarian opposition, while his public 
e#orts as a professor of political science and history, commentator, lecturer, 
and journalist resonated in both Croatian- and English-speaking communi-
ties. Grateful to America for his and his family’s freedom, safety, and oppor-
tunities, Raditsa implicitly spells out the role of the post-war “DP [Displaced 
Persons] intelligentsia,” harbored by America, “doomed to death” in their 
home countries, to which he himself belonged: “… the new immigrant in-
telligentsia must "rst mold itself to the American pa$ern and try to establish 
itself in the growing American intellectual tradition” (“Some Displaced”). 
For the purposes of this format, I will not so much try to rehabilitate 
Raditsa, since neither he nor his works need that kind of a$ention, but will 
use his high stature and his reputation as one of the leading Croatian political 
émigrés to highlight a series of ruptures and discontinuities observable in the 
otherwise &atly designated phenomenon, o%entimes still used in a deroga-
tory sense, of Croatian political emigration. Let me take a step back here in 
order to remind the reader that this ambivalent term was in fact coined by 
the Yugoslav socialist regime, especially its arm that was authorized to deal 
with the considerable segment of its citizens that was leaving the country for 
one reason or another. In order to ideologically di#erentiate among these, the 
category of “emigration” was prefaced by additional modi"ers, such as polit-
ical, extremist, enemy, or Ustasha, o%en regardless of the substantive charge 
behind these categories.3 (In case of other antagonistic national or political 
groups, since the state did not lack enemies, real or invented, other modi"ers 
3   !is is amply illustrated in the 1974 booklet Politička emigracija, authored by 
two high-ranking o+cers in the YPA (Yugoslav People’s Army) which was to be used as 
“an o+cial textbook … for the socio-political education of YPA soldiers and seamen” 
(Domankušić and Levkov n.p.).
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were used, such as “informbiro” or “cominform” for pro-Stalinist and pro-So-
viet elements, or “irredentist,” which was a code word for Albanian political 
emigration.) Likewise, appropriate nomenclature was used to designate the 
apolitical branches of Yugoslav emigrants abroad. If a person happened to 
land on the list of politically proscribed emigrants, it spelled for him almost 
by default the loss of all civil rights in Yugoslavia. Such was the case with Ra-
ditsa a%er his sudden defection from the country in 1945. 
To go back to the main line of my argument, we need to understand 
how Raditsa, as a member of the "rst wave of Croatian political emigration 
a%er WW II, considered and assessed the phenomenon of the second wave of 
Croatian political emigration caused by the crackdown ordered by Tito him-
self on the reformist forces of the Croatian Spring and happening in the wake 
of the Spring’s violent shutdown in late 1971 and a%erwards. !e time-frame 
for my analysis, then, will comprise the ten years stretching from 1970, focus-
ing especially on the ominous 1971, to 1980 and the death of Josip Broz Tito. 
It is necessary to delimit the scope of our research given Raditsa’s proli"c pro-
duction. Beyond these technical observations, another consideration dictates 
such a focus, which this essay will aim at demonstrating by presenting the 
main lines of Raditsa’s thought as laid out in his contributions to Hrvatska 
revija from 1970 to 1980.4 Writing in early 1970, he calls the crisis permeat-
ing Yugoslavia at the dawn of the 1970s “an organic Yugoslav crisis” (1970: 
21). He cites other sources contending that the large part of the turbulences 
occurred due to “deep national con&icts” (ibid.). Even economic questions, 
pressing as they may have been, stood subservient to the national issue exac-
erbated due to a deep ideological crisis—the Party and its politics based on 
Marxism no longer bound the nations in the federation together (1970: 22). 
Moreover, he considers the national right of self-determination to be one of 
the major political principles of the twentieth century (ibid.). I have delib-
4   !e impact of Hrvatska revija on the cultural life of the diaspora was incalculabe, 
as testi"ed by its uninrerrupted course of publication since its reactivation in Buenos Aires 
in 1951; cf. Brešić; Listeš. 
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erately highlighted this essay as inaugural for the 1970s, since it shows in a 
nutshell Raditsa’s preoccupations for the next ten years and beyond. 
In Raditsa’s case, in which he was hardly alone, he hailed with enthusi-
asm the rise of Croatian national awareness that was in evidence at least from 
1966 and the fall of Aleksandar Ranković, Tito’s right hand and the prover-
bial almighty chief of the Yugoslav secret police.5 When the Spring e#ective-
ly ended by a military and police crackdown, it signalled for Raditsa a new 
phase, not only for Croatia, but also for the Croatian diaspora, and, ultimate-
ly, for his own political philosophy as he makes clear. !is is then why 1971 
is so charged a year on many levels. !is comes to the fore in the way Raditsa 
tries to make sense of the violent end of the Croatian Spring, the debacle in 
Karađorđevo, “the new Croatian catastrophe in Yugoslavia” (Hrvatska 1945, 
33, 44). Up to that point he was still willing to consider the existence of Cro-
atia as a federal unit in the Yugoslav fold. !is a$itude was in part a re&ection 
of both his idealism and his political realism—his understanding that the 
West wants Yugoslavia to survive and needs it as an idea.
As we posit 1971 as a turning point, we should "rst look at the way 
Raditsa positions himself with regard to the events in Croatia and Yugoslavia 
before 1971, while considering their imbrications with the Cold-War con-
tainment politics of the superpowers. !is will show how Raditsa always de-
velops his insights and analyses in the process of triangulating the Croatian 
strain, its diasporic resonance, and the global Realpolitik to which these two 
are o%en subservient. For instance, considering his U.S. public appearances, 
there are at least two or three major phases to be considered. One is the key 
propagandist role that, alongside Louis Adamic (alternatively, Adamič), Ra-
ditsa played as one of the vocal promoters of Tito and the Partisans’ side as 
principal antifascist factors on the ground in Yugoslavia as they made clear 
in the critical period of  late 1943 and 1944. While initially Tito appreciat-
5   !at Ranković’s fall inaugurated a process of restricted economic and political 
liberalisation is argued, among others, by Ante Batović. It is thus probable that a few years 
later a full-&edged reformist movement might have &ourished. Cf. Ponoš 17. 
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ed their engagement (to the extent that Raditsa came back to Yugoslavia in 
1945), later on he would denounce Raditsa as a “warmonger,” when the la$er 
no longer countenanced the situation in Yugoslavia a%er the war (Hrvatska 
1945, 44, 358). In addition, it was almost inevitable that, while at the outset 
of the Cold War in the 1950s Raditsa’s sharply polemical articles critical of 
the situation in his home country were welcomed by the leading U.S. political 
and public opinion magazines, this ceased to be the case as the 1960s began.6 
At that point in time, with Yugoslavia becoming a factor in internation-
al relations and a major U.S. ally in the bipolar world, a negative view of Tito 
and his regime was not endorsed either by the State Department or by the 
major political journals. So in his late 1970 contribution to Hrvatska revija, 
he admi$ed that the o+cial U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia had not wavered 
during the Cold War, and that it was more than likely that the pro-Titoist 
direction would remain a mainstay of the State Department’s foreign policy 
(1970: 518, 519). As for his further analyses of U.S. foreign policy in South-
eastern Europe, Raditsa on more than one occasion warned against what at 
times loomed as a possibility in this period: namely, for the Americans to 
surrender Yugoslavia to the Soviets (1970: 531). !us it is at that point that 
Raditsa began to focus his energy more on publishing in a series of Croa-
tian emigrant publications, including Hrvatski glas (Canada), Nova Hrvatska 
(London, U.K.), the Journal of Croatian Studies (New York City, U.S.A.), Hr-
vatska revija (Barcelona and München, at the time), and Danica (Chicago, 
U.S.A.), to mention a few, which spanned the spectrum from le% to right. 
His activities demonstrate a clear diasporic disposition at work, as his texts 
spread from London to Canada, from the United States to Buenos Aires and, 
later, to Barcelona and München, to all centers of Croatian emigrant cultural 
6   Many of Raditsa’s friends recall that he was never one to mince words, as is 
evident in his 1953 piece on Moscow and Belgrade, in which he unequivocally calls Tito 
a “dictator” (“Malenkov’s”). In a 1951 editorial for !e Saturday Evening Post, he took 
another hard look at the conditions in communist Yugoslavia while trying to make a case 
against “unconditional aid” “in loans and food supplies” from the West, the United States in 
particular, to the crisis-ridden Yugoslavia (“Yugoslavia Will Be a New Headache”).
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and political activity. 
As it has already been suggested that the global Realpolitik was an axle 
around which revolved both the status of Yugoslavia and, consequently, the 
a$itude that the politically engaged diaspora took to it, in the remainder of 
this essay I will "rst present Raditsa’s main international political concerns in 
this period, 1970–1980, and then embed his view of the Croatian situation in 
that particular international constellation. 
!e world at the time was a bipolar world, according to Raditsa, in 
which Yugoslavia, for be$er or worse, found itself vacillating between the 
East and the West (1970: 531). Despite its non-aligned status, or precisely 
because of it, insofar as that status was a viable political option, the country 
found itself wooed by the superpowers. !is comes to the fore in the 1970s 
in both a conspicuous and anecdotal manner. Namely, during that decade 
the country was visited by both the leader of the “free world,” i.e., President 
Nixon, and on few occasions also by Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secre-
tary of the Soviet Politburo. Raditsa invites us to consider the symbolic of the 
two visitors when he reminds his readers that Nixon also visited Croatia, and 
Zagreb, during his o+cial visit to Yugoslavia in 1972, unlike Brezhnev, who 
in 1971 stayed in the ominous (for Croatia) Karađorđevo (1974: 3-15; for a 
description of Brezhnev’s visit, cf. Banac). Later on, these two leaders would 
come to play a prominent role in the process of détente aimed at reducing 
the tension and geo-political strain resulting from the arms race, when they 
would sign a bilateral agreement. !ese developments were assessed at the 
time by Raditsa in an ambivalent light (1973: 8).7 During those years he con-
sidered international political events within the framework of “a deep moral 
and political crisis bese$ing Europe and America” and signaling the decline 
of the West (1974: 3), which spelled bleak prospects for Croatia. 
It is thus inevitable that the coup of 1971 that shook up most Croatian 
7   In a related context, that of the assessment of the Croatian Spring forty years 
later, Rinna Kullaa of Finland considers how the “crisis in Croatia,” one of its various names, 
was narrativized and framed by U.S. intelligence reports, while also placing it tentatively 
within the context of East–West relations in Europe at the time; cf. Kullaa 93-109.  
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institutions, from political to cultural to economic, caused Raditsa to focus 
on the fate of Croatia and its new wave of emigrants. In accounting for the 
clash of generations that became observable in the 1970s as scores of new 
politically hardened candidates &ocked to the shores of the old immigration 
destinations of Croats, such as the United States, it will perhaps be helpful to 
us to personalize this historical moment by staging it as a dispute between 
the old and the new guard. !e old guard stands represented by staunch po-
litical liberals, such as Raditsa, by Croatian antifascist nationalists (the circle 
around Dr. Krnjević and “his” HSS [Croatian Peasant Party]), or by right-
wing nationalists, while the new guard, or the Spring generation as Raditsa 
dubbed them, was represented by radical lions, many of whom were already 
politically seasoned by their membership in the League of Communists and 
now further incensed a%er they had been turned out in purges, tried and sen-
tenced in staged trials, or simply allowed to leave the country before ending 
up in prison (1978: 371; 1979: 580). Some of these young lions found them-
selves on the warpath against the regime which only yesterday was extending 
a promise of a be$er society and o#ering a whi# of reformist hope. !e new 
type of Croatian political activist was personi"ed in the "gure of the late Bru-
no Bušić for several reasons, as suggested in the following excerpts: 
Bruno Bušić had been a representative of an entirely new Croatian generation 
… . He had been brought up in Yugoslavia, where he was publishing even 
in completely legal newspaper [sic] at the time of the “Croatian Spring,” in 
the early seventies. Of course[,] he already aroused Belgrade’s indignation 
in those days, so that they eventually arrested him. But he was de"nitely not 
one who could be politically incriminated with the sins of the past and subse-
quently discredited in the eyes of the world. (Rullman 16; original in English) 
Moreover, “Bušić also shocked many older political emigrants who had le% 
their country because they were "ghting Communism. He openly advocated 
the inclusion of the Croatian Communists in a national united front against 
the regime in Belgrade” (Rullmann 16). 
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How can we account for this shi%? A historical sketch might help us 
here. One of the most publicized events of the Croatian Spring was certain-
ly the strike organized by the University of Zagreb students and led by the 
student leaders of whom some of the most prominent were Dražen Budiša, 
Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, Ante Paradžik, and Ivan Dodig. A%er the students were 
pressured to end the strike on December 4, 1971, Budiša was reported to 
have said: “!ose who come next will be even more radical than we were” (cf. 
Jakovina 10), these words ringing as his political testament and sounding all 
the more ominous in view of the impending trial sentencing the student lead-
ers to multiple years in prison. !e subsequent events proved Budiša right, 
however. !e young mis"ts, now coming mostly from the folds of the Party 
itself, Tito’s prodigal sons, so to speak, began to "ll the ranks of the Croatian 
emigration, bringing with them the ways and means of conducting political 
combat that the older generation found too radical, violent, and de"cient 
in democracy to help the cause. Already in March 1972, while the backlash 
against the Spring protagonists was still in force, Raditsa strongly denounced 
“the rhetoric of so-called revolutionary actions” that may have only further 
damaged Croatia’s position (1972: 11), all the more so since it was his con-
viction that, one way or another, “Tito is politically dead” (1972: 16). !e 
problem is, however, as Raditsa contended, that his refusal to step down or 
announce his successor was holding the entire country hostage (1972: 8). 
We can see how Raditsa weighs in with his comments and his politi-
cal acumen that was sensitive to any show of anti-democratic violence stand-
ing in for political deliberation and debate. !e material o#ered by Raditsa’s 
younger compeers was rife indeed. We must remember that the 1970s were a 
decade of terrorism and other means of violent political strife worldwide (cf. 
Bilandžić 67), so that the actions undertaken by certain minority segments 
of the Croatian emigration "t the bill and showed certain parallels with other 
politically minded and active groups (both on the right and the le% end of 
the political spectrum).8 Raditsa found himself bewildered, if not appalled, 
8   For contemporary views on the impact and spread of terrorist activites amid 
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by the turn of events in a number of high-pro"le cases involving Croatian 
political emigrants. To name but a few in the turbulent 1970s, there was the 
alleged terrorist group incursion into Yugoslav territory in 1972 known as 
the Bugojno incident, which was swi%ly foiled by the authorities with most 
of the in"ltrators being killed and the few survivors being sentenced to death 
or long-term imprisonments by court marshal; the hijacking of a TWA air-
liner executed in the United States by an underground formation headed by 
Zvonko Bušić in 1976; several cases of extortion and blackmail in the Cro-
atian emigrant communities in the United States; the threat of political as-
sassinations and political in"ghting (o%en spurred by Yugoslav secret-service 
and counterintelligence activity); and two court cases involving alleged ter-
rorist conspiracies by Australian Croats in Australia, while the list could be 
extended. In addition, in 1978 there was an internationally infamous case of 
the intended swap of three high-pro"le West German members of the Rote 
Armee Fraktion terrorist organization (who had been apprehended in Za-
greb) for eight Yugoslav dissidents residing in West Germany (among them 
were six Croats who were alleged members of extremist emigrant groups). 
!is protracted case in turn triggered other violent responses by all the par-
ties involved.9 (As an aside, this is no place to enter a more detailed analysis of 
intricate links that the Yugoslav regime, while pursuing the so-called politics 
of non-alignment and denouncing terrorism, was maintaining with di#er-
ent terrorist and independence groups and movements, especially from the 
!ird World—such as the PLO but not restricted to that, as the above case 
with the \F makes clear.)
factions of Croatian emigration cf. Clissold (for a general picture and despite occasional 
imprecision); for an insider’s view, cf. Korsky. 
9   !e chronology of this veritable international conundrum causing serious 
friction between West Germany and Yugoslavia can be followed on the pages of any major 
publication in the diaspora at the time. !eir coverage is all the more interesting because 
they included foreign sources and reports, notably those from West Germany. Needless to 
say, reports in the Yugoslav press were streamlined and censored. For a di#erent vantage 
point on the crisis but con"rming its cause, course, and outlines, cf. Baković. I would like to 
express my gratitude to Dr. Ivica Šute for his help and advice with bibliography.
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!e entanglement of terrorist and freedom movements as a response 
to an ideologically split world called for Raditsa’s ongoing comments and re-
&ections. An interesting perspective on where the Croatian diaspora stood in 
that respect can be read in his 1975 essay, where he a$empts a psychological 
portrait of the activists. He distinguishes three groups in diaspora, namely, 
American Croats, Croatian Americans, and lastly and most importantly for 
his argument, Croatian Croats, born and raised in communist Yugoslavia. 
While the "rst two groups seem to have accommodated themselves to the 
conditions in their host country, the last group poses an interesting problem 
both in ideological and political terms. According to Raditsa, this group is 
violently nationalistic, not refraining even from embracing Ustasha ideas, 
but not denouncing social communism, either, providing that it secured an 
independent state. In the a$ainment of that goal, they are hampered by nei-
ther guilt nor awe (1975: 379), while they retain the right, so the reasoning 
goes, to implement all and any revolutionary means—including guerilla tac-
tics and terrorism (ibid.). Not surprisingly, for Raditsa they exhibit clear-cut 
totalitarian aspects, especially considering that they turn away from America 
in despair over its unchanging containment politics and even try to court the 
support of the Soviets, thus commi$ing an unthinkable breach according to 
Raditsa’s staunch liberal views. 
In the wake of various dramatic events, Raditsa warns in his commen-
tary in the periodical Danica, published in Chicago, of the “cancer of ter-
rorism,” while pointing out that in recent times the name “Croatian” in the 
States has become almost synonymous with terrorism, its holders classi"ed 
alongside the supporters of the PLO, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans (Danica, 
1981: 1, 9). On the other hand, as Raditsa contends, neither the Poles nor 
the Ukraninians resort to terrorism. !is orientation, Raditsa warns further, 
might delegitimize the struggle for the accomplishment of a free state. Ear-
lier, in his 1974 concluding piece to his above-mentioned memoirs Hrvats-
ka 1945, he makes the following prediction—that by the end of the century 
Croatia must and will be a free state, and that such a fateful decision will have 
to be made by the people at home, not by the diaspora (Hrvatska 1945, 366). 
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It is therefore with great misgivings that he looks at the dissipation of energy 
and the loss of young lives and freedom on the part of the latest and exceed-
ingly radical "ghters in the ranks of the Croatian political emigration. Further-
more, he strongly resents the use of essentially non-democratic and violent 
forms of activism—including political assassinations—that is totally alien 
both to his political habitus and to American democratic principles (Hrvatski 
glas, 1980: 1). True to his democratic disposition, he truly believed in the 
inalienable right of self-determination of a people, based on President Wil-
son’s principles, subsequently reinforced by the United Nation’s charter, and 
eventually so &atly betrayed by both the Versailles and the Yalta agreements. 
In his 1975 text, he weaves these ideas into a map of a contemporary world 
that breaks down into “a world of freedom” and “a world of totalitarianism” 
(1975: 373). In March 1975, for instance, he considers decolonization as one 
of the major trends of the twentieth century: “the revolutionary rise of erst-
while small and obscure nations onto the stage of history” (1975: 20). !is 
gives wings to his reiterated argument—that the principle of independence 
and self-determination, of universal political and moral value, therefore must 
also apply to Croatia, being a ma$er of historical necessity (1978: 3). It is the 
same belief, however, that inspired the anonymous author or authors of the 
Declaration and the Appeal to the American People, the documents meant to 
be distributed during the hijacking of the TWA airliner commi$ed in 1976, 
as mentioned above.10 A glance at Raditsa’s thoughts, however, will suggest 
how this act, rightly deemed terrorist, crystallized di#erent reactions and ce-
mented the generational division within the Croatian emigration. Even while 
he could see the political logic behind the action and the li%ing of silence 
sti&ing Croatia in the a%ermath of the Spring’s demise, he nonetheless notes 
a change in the ranks of the latest emigrants and somewhat ruefully remarks 
on their aggressiveness and non-democratic methods assumed under com-
10   Maruna’s report from 1995 is the most complete chronology to date of the events 
following the hijacking, as he uses his position as the court interpreter for the hijackers to 
follow the day-to-day events in the courtroom. In the "nal part of his study, he presents the 
texts of the two documents whose authorship has not been con"rmed to this day. 
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munism and now used even to denounce the older generation (1979: 580). 
It was thus the case that the newcomers’ radical methods sowed seeds of dis-
cord within the diaspora and contributed to the image of the turbulent 1970s. 
Unlike his younger counterparts, Raditsa sees the inevitability of the 
demise of communist regimes worldwide due to the unfolding principle of 
universal human rights, while predicting that, within the Yugoslav fold, the 
principle of national self-determination will take place (Nova Hrvatska, 1979: 
8). Given his lifelong political philosophy, only a segment of which could be 
presented here, for Raditsa the end did not justify the means, as was the case 
for his political sons. !e subsequent developments will prove him right. 
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